



Critical Collection Problems Committee

Intelligence Activities Against Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Top Secret

TS 204206/72 USIB-D-64.7/2 CCPC-D-18/72 October 1972

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CCPC Study


Of

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

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CCPC STUDY OF

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AGAINST NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Charge

On 31 January 1972, the Director of Central Intelligence requested the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of the USIB to conduct a review of intelligence efforts against narcotics, looking into such problems as "the coordination of collection, dissemination and production of national intelligence information on narcotics; the gaps in our knowledge of this subject; additions to, or adjustments in, resources allocated to this problem which might be made in order to fill these gaps; and to make recommendations for improvements in our overall intelligence on this subject." He requested the CCPC "to give particular attention to means by which better information on those trafficking systems which manufacture and transport hard narcotics into the United States can be developed."

B. Definition and Scope

- 1. In order that intelligence efforts be focused on those aspects which are of most critical concern to the U.S. Government, this study is concerned primarily with the so-called "hard narcotics," i. e., those which are addicting as opposed to merely habituating, although considerable attention is also devoted to cocaine because of the size of the problem which it represents.
- 2. A drug is addicting if it causes the abuser to be physiologically as well as psychologically dependent upon it. Other factors are the development of tolerance (the same quantity will not give the same effect over a period of time) and the irresistible urge to continue taking the drug. Of the drugs prominently involved in the international traffic, only the opiates are truly addicting. Cocaine and cannabis products, on the other hand, are habituating. In the use of these products, although psychological dependence develops, no physiological dependence is created. The opiates of concern are opium (raw), morphine base (intermediate) and heroin (finished product), the drug desired by the consumer, the addict.



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- 3. This study is concerned chiefly with the foreign intelligence aspects of the narcotics problem. It does not concern itself with domestic aspects other than the coordination and the distribution, retrieval and use of intelligence information, or with law enforcement other than intelligence support thereto.
- 4. It also does not specifically address the numerous on-going research and development projects in the narcotics field. So far, there has been no major breakthrough which can make a meaningful contribution to narcotics-related intelligence. This subject is under continuing review by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
- 5. A basic assumption of this study is that movement of opium products to the United States, as distinct from the flow to foreign markets, receives priority in intelligence collection and enforcement programs. It is recognized that ordering of priorities is a problem in those areas, such as Southeast Asia, where large "traditional" markets for opium and heroin exist. Trafficking and smuggling systems that move opiates to such markets must be closely monitored, because of their potential for diverting products to the lucrative U.S. market. Any system that deals in heroin for the U.S. market even as a sideline to its main activity of supplying "traditional" markets, is, however, a prime intelligence target.

